Opinions released in October, 2009
Showing records 1 - 10 of 17 results
| Opinion number: 2009-179 | |
| Requestor: Stewart, Chris H. Att'y for Arkansas Progressive Group | Release date: 10/21/2009 |
| Full Opinion: HTML or PDF | |
| Request for certification of the popular name and ballot title of a proposed constitutional amendment to repeal the state income tax and other state taxes, enact a flat rate state consumption tax and other purposes. RESPONSE: Rejected due to several ambiguities. | |
| Opinion number: 2009-183 | |
| Requestor: Witherell, Stacey Labor & Relations Mgr., City of LR | Release date: 10/20/2009 |
| Full Opinion: HTML or PDF | |
| Is the decision of the custodian of records to release, among other things, an employee's name in response to a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request consistent with provisions of the FOIA? RESPONSE: In my opinion, your decision is consistent with the FOIA. | |
| Opinion number: 2009-148 | |
| Requestor: Thompson, Robert State Senator | Release date: 10/19/2009 |
| Full Opinion: HTML or PDF | |
| Does A.C.A. 27-37-706 prevent municipalities from assessing additional fees through Sec. 2 of Act 209 of 2009 on a seat belt violation as defined in Act 308 of 2009? RESPONSE: No, regarding the additional fines that are addressed by Section 2 of Act 209 of 2009. (Please note that contrary to the wording of this question, Section 2 of Act 209 amended a statute - A.C.A. 16-17-129 - that authorizes the levy of additional fines, not fees, to provide additional funding for jails. While Section 27-37-706 plainly prohibits additional court costs and fees, it does not prohibit additional fines. Accord Op. 2003-117. | |
| Opinion number: 2009-144 | |
| Requestor: Lea, Andrea State Representative | Release date: 10/19/2009 |
| Full Opinion: HTML or PDF | |
| What is the validity of an ordinance passed by a city council of [a] city of [the] first class in which the mayor subsequently vetoes pursuant to his authority under A.C.A. 14-43-504(e)(1), but then fails to file a written statement of his reasons for vetoing the ordinance with the office of city clerk and fails to present [his reasons] to the city council at their next regular city council meeting as required by A.C.A. 14-43-504(e)(2)(A)? RESPONSE: This may be a fact quesiton, but assuming the mayor failed to observe the formalities required for a veto under A.C.A. 14-43-504(e), then the veto likely failed and the ordinance probably remains effective. | |
| Opinion number: 2009-141 | |
| Requestor: Lea, Andrea State Representative | Release date: 10/19/2009 |
| Full Opinion: HTML or PDF | |
| (Q1)Suppose an employee is appointed or promoted as contemplated by A.C.A. 14-51-301(b)(7)(A). Suppose further that the appointee must take an extended period of leave for whatever reason and therefore cannot be physically present at his job during his probationary period. Consequently, the appointee cannot be evaluated for the full probationary period. If this situation arises, can the civil service commission extend the probationary period? (Q2) If a police chief or fire chief has some kind of "disciplinary" problem with an appointee, may the chief extend the probationary period contemplated by A.C.A. 14-51-301(b)(7)(A)? (Q3) If your answer to Question 2 is "no," would the probationary extension be permitted if the appointee agrees to the extension? (Q4) If your answer to Question 3 is "no," may the civil service commission promulgate a rule that allows police and/or fire chiefs to extend the A.C.A. 14-51-301(b)(7)(A) probationary period "for disciplinary reasons"? RESPONSE: In my opinion, the answer to all your questions is "no." Section 14-51-301(b)(7)(A) does not leave any room for the civil service commission to extend the probationary period beyond the time specified in the statute. Accordingly, if the civil service commission promulgated such a rule, it would be contrary to state law. | |
| Opinion number: 2009-139 | |
| Requestor: Lea, Andrea State Representative | Release date: 10/19/2009 |
| Full Opinion: HTML or PDF | |
| (Q1) The State of Arkansas has enacted laws prohibiting sex offenders from entering certain areas. May a city of the first class add to that list by passing an ordinance that prohibits sex offenders from entering additional areas? (Q2) The State of Arkansas has enacted laws requiring registered sex offenders to maintain a specific distance from certain locations. Can a first class city pass an ordinance requiring registered sex offenders to maintain an even greater distance from those places? RESPONSE: In my opinion, the answer to both questions is "no." An ordinance cannot be broader than the state statute upon which it is based. | |
| Opinion number: 2009-138 | |
| Requestor: Lea, Andrea State Representative | Release date: 10/19/2009 |
| Full Opinion: HTML or PDF | |
| Q1) If a city council of a city of the first class decides to form a committee from the city council composed only of a part of the aldermen, must such an action be done by ordinance, resolution or motion under the authority of either A.C.A. 14-43-501 or A.C.A. 14-58-301? Q2) If a committee was formed by the city council by the passage of an ordinance or resolution, does the mayor have the ability to veto the ordinance or resolution? Q3) If a committee was formed by the city council by motion, does the mayor have the ability to veto the motion if the motion is passed by the council? Q4) Does a city council of a city of the first class possess an inherent power under Arkansas state statutory or case law to form itself into committees for the purpose of oversight, investigation and making recommendations to the whole body of the city council despite a mayor's objection or veto of the actions forming a committee? RESPONSE: Q1) There is nothing in A.C.A. 14-43-501 specifically addressing the formation of committees comprised in part of members of a city council. Section 14-58-301 does not require an ordinance for the creation of a committee to deal with financial matters. Compare. Otherwise, the statute is silent. Q2) Generally yes, pursuant to A.C.A. 14-43-504. Q3) Probably no, assuming the particular committee was properly formed by motion, because a motion is not included within those actions that are subject to the mayor's veto pursuant to A.C.A. 14-43-504(e)(1). But motions have sometimes been held to be forms of resolutions. Q4) The council's action in forming such committees may be subject to veto by the mayor. But the council has the authority to override, by a two-thirds vote, the mayor's veto. A.C.A. 14-43-504(e)(2)(B). | |
| Opinion number: 2009-174 | |
| Requestor: Gilbert, Sherry Sponsor, Healthcare Measure | Release date: 10/16/2009 |
| Full Opinion: HTML or PDF | |
| Request for certification of a proposed initiated measure to guarantee sovereignty over health care for Arkansas citizens, and other purposes. RESPONSE: Rejected for failure to comply with statutory requirements to provide popular name and ballot title. | |
| Opinion number: 2009-169 | |
| Requestor: Steward, Chris H. Attorney for Secure Arkansas | Release date: 10/14/2009 |
| Full Opinion: HTML or PDF | |
| Request for certification of the popular name and ballot title of a proposed constitutional amendment to prevent persons unlawfully present in the United States from receiving certain public benefits, and other purposes. ANSWER: Ballot title and popular name approved as submitted. | |
| Opinion number: 2009-142 | |
| Requestor: Lea, Andrea State Representative | Release date: 10/13/2009 |
| Full Opinion: HTML or PDF | |
| Does A.C.A. 26-75-602(c )(1) allow a city of the first class to levy a 1/3% tax on the gross receipts of RV parks, which are businesses that rent or otherwise charge people spaces for profit for them to park their RV and other camping vehicles or trailers for overnight or extended stays at the RV park? In other words, does an RV park as just described, count as a hotel, motel or short-term condominium rental accommodations for sleeping, meeting or party room facilities for profit, under A.C.A. 26-75-602(c )(1)? RESPONSE: In my opinion, A.C.A. 26-75-602(c)(1) allows a city to levy a gross receipts tax on the gross receipts of RV parks subject to the exemption for rental periods of thirty days or more. | |
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